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Abstract
Part I traces the evolution of Ethiopia’s constitutional human rights guarantees in each of
the country’s constitutional manifestations from the period of Emperor Haile Selassie’s reign to
the present. Part II explores the status of fundamental rights and freedoms in Ethiopia’s 1995
FDRE Constitution. Part III describes the players and processes of Ethiopia’s complex system of
non-judicial constitutional review, including the dominant role played by the HOF and Council
of Constitutional Inquiry and the marginalized role of the courts. Part IV presents a comparative
analysis of countries engaged in non-judicial constitutional review, including China, the former
Soviet Union, and Finland. Part V explores the practical implications of non-judicial constitutional
review on the enforcement of human rights in Ethiopia. It argues that the HOF lacks independence
from the executive and thus cannot be trusted to adjudicate sensitive political matters involving the
Constitution in an unbiased manner. This Part also argues that Ethiopia’s system of non-judicial
constitutional review weakens the judiciary’s power to check the constitutional excesses of the
other branches of government; may fail to protect the rights of minority groups in constitutional
disputes due to the majoritarian make-up of the House of Federation; and perpetuates an inefficient
system that precludes access to justice. Part VI calls for constitutional and judicial reforms that
will result in an independent, organized, and efficient system of judicial review in Ethiopia.
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INTRODUCTION
The 1995 Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic
of Ethiopia ("FDRE") provides broad human rights protections
in conformity with international human rights laws and principles. Nonetheless, the House of Federation ("HOF"), a parliamentary political organ that represents the political interests of
Ethiopia's ethnic groups, is mandated to interpret the Constitution at the exclusion of the judiciary. This Report culminates a
semester-long project undertaken by the Walter Leitner International Human Rights Clinic at Fordham Law School, in partnership with faculty and students at Ethiopia's Addis Ababa University Faculty of Law, to study Ethiopia's system of non-judicial constitutional review and to investigate its impact on the protection
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of fundamental human rights and freedoms. While in Ethiopia,
the Leitner Clinic-Addis Ababa Law School delegation met with
Ethiopian lawyers, judges, human rights defenders, constitutional law scholars, and representatives from the Ministry of Justice, HOF, and Prime Minister's Office. This Report presents
the findings of this research effort.
The list of enumerated fundamental rights and freedoms in
the Ethiopian FDRE Constitution is progressive and impressive.'
The question, however, is whether there exist strong and competent institutions to protect and enforce these rights.2 One of the
most crucial institutions in the protection of human rights
should be the judiciary.3 Yet, when a constitutional dispute
arises in Ethiopia courts must forward the case to the HOF for
adjudication. 4 In Article 13(1), the Constitution states that the
judiciary has the duty to enforce the fundamental rights and
freedoms in the Constitution.5 However, the judiciary has been
1. See RAKEB MESSELE, ENFORCEMENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN ETHIOPIA 15 (2002),
available at http://www.apapeth.org/Docs/ENFORCEMENT%200F%20HR.pdf; Interview with Fasil Nahum, Senior Legal Adviser to the Prime Minister, in Addis Ababa, Eth.
(Apr. 7, 2008); see also Nicole B. Herther-Spiro, Can Ethnic FederalismPrevent "Recourse to
Rebellion?" A Comparative Analysis of the Ethiopian and Iraqi Constitutional Structures, 21
EMORY INT'L L. REv. 321, 345-48, 354-55 (2007); T.S. Twibell, Ethiopian Constitutional
Law: The Structure of the Ethiopian Government and the New Constitution'sAbility to Overcome
Ethiopia'sProblems, 21 Loy. L.A. INT'L & CoMp. L. REV. 399, 409, 418-21, 424-31, 438-46,
448-49 (1999). But see Minasse Haile, The New Ethiopian Constitution: Its Impact upon
Unity, Human Rights andDevelopment, 20 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REv. 1, 46 (1996) [hereinafter Haile, The New Ethiopian Constitution] (arguing that the Constitution's creation
of a powerful federal government undermines any rights it confers); Minasse Haile,
Comparing Human Rights in Two Ethiopian Constitutions: The Emperor's and the "Republic's"-Cucullus Non Facit Monachum, 13 CARDOZO J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 1, 30-32 (2005)
[hereinafter Haile, ComparingHuman Rights in Two Ethiopian Constitutions] (noting that
the Constitution suspends basic human rights in times of national emergency); Alemante G. Selassie, Ethnic Federalism: Its Promise and Pitfallsfor Africa, 28 YALE J. INT'L L.
51, 93-96 (2003) (arguing that the Constitution's support of ethnic federalism militates
against the concept of human rights).
2. See Haile, ComparingHuman Rights in Two Ethiopian Constitutions, supra note 1, at
26-32; Messele, supra note 1, at 15-16; Interview with Fasil Nahum, supra note 1; see also
Elena A. Baylis, Beyond Rights: Legal Process and Ethnic Conflicts, 25 MICH. J. INT'L L. 529,
548-62 (2004); Haile, The New Ethiopian Constitution, supra note 1, at 46; Herther-Spiro,
supra note 1, at 337-38, 350-52, 354-55, 364-67; Kimberly Medlock Wigger, Ethiopia: A
Dichotomy of Despair and Hope, 5 TuLSA J. CoMP. & I'r'L L. 389, 399-401 (1998);James
C.N. Paul, Human Rights and the Structure of Security Forces in Constitutional Orders: The
Case of Ethiopia, 3 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 235, 239, 246-56 (1994); Twibell, supra note
1, at 418-21, 424-31, 438-46, 448-49.
3. See Messele, supra note 1, at 15-16.
4. ETH. CoNsT. art. 84 § 2.
5. Id. art. 13 § 1; see Messele, supra note 1, at 23.
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stripped of one of its most powerful tools in guarding against the
infringement of constitutionally guaranteed human rights-the
power of judicial review.6
Part I traces the evolution of Ethiopia's constitutional
human rights guarantees in each of the country's constitutional
manifestations from the period of Emperor Haile Selassie's
reign to the present. Part II explores the status of fundamental
rights and freedoms in Ethiopia's 1995 FDRE Constitution. Part
III describes the players and processes of Ethiopia's complex system of non-judicial constitutional review, including the dominant role played by the HOF and Council of Constitutional Inquiry and the marginalized role of the courts. Part IV presents a
comparative analysis of countries engaged in non-judicial constitutional review, including China, the former Soviet Union, and
Finland. Part V explores the practical implications of non-judicial constitutional review on the enforcement of human rights in
Ethiopia. It argues that the HOF lacks independence from the
executive and thus cannot be trusted to adjudicate sensitive political matters involving the Constitution in an unbiased manner.
This Part also argues that Ethiopia's system of non-judicial constitutional review weakens thejudiciary's power to check the constitutional excesses of the other branches of government; may
fail to protect the rights of minority groups in constitutional disputes due to the majoritarian make-up of the House of Federation; and perpetuates an inefficient system that precludes access
to justice. Part VI calls for constitutional and judicial reforms
that will result in an independent, organized, and efficient system of judicial review in Ethiopia.
I. HUMAN RIGHTS CHALLENGES DURING ETHIOPIA'S
CONSTITUTIONAL ERAS
Ethiopia's modern constitutional eras have presented
unique human rights challenges. 7 Emperor Haile Selassie I as6. See Haile, The New Ethiopian Constitution, supra note 1, at 54-59.
7. Ethiopia is an amalgamation of approximately eight)' disparate and distinct ethnic groups that speak approximately eighty different languages and adhere to many
different faiths, including Christianity, Islam, Judaism, and Animism. See Selassie, supra
note 1, at 61; Interview with Fasil Nahum, supra note 1; see alsoJulie Macfarlane, Working
Towards RestorativeJustice in Ethiopia: IntegratingTraditionalConflict Resolution Systems with
the Formal Legal System, 8 CARDOZO J. CONFLIcr RESOL. 487, 498-99 (2007); Aaron P.
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cended the throne in 1930.8 Selassie enacted two Constitutions
during his reign.9 Ethiopia's first Constitution came into force
in 1931,10 and a revised Constitution was adopted in 1955."1
Both the 1931 and 1955 Constitutions codified the unlimited
and inalienable power of the sovereign over his subjects and included few, if any, human rights protections.' 2 The slow pace
and limited nature of Emperor Selassie's political and economic
reforms led to an attempted coup in 1960." Selassie was blamed
for failing to acknowledge and alleviate the suffering of Ethiopians perishing due to drought and famine.' 4
The Coordinating Committee of the Armed Forces, Police,
and Territorial Army, or the Derg as it was commonly known,
was a pan-military dictatorship with communist aspirations,
which overthrew Emperor Selassie in a "creeping coup," resulting in Selassie's imprisonment in 1974 and death in 1975.15 In
the months prior to Selassie's arrest, the government prepared a
draft of a revised Constitution, in an apparent attempt to placate
the Derg. 6 This draft Constitution attempted to form a constitutional monarchy. 17 The draft Constitution, however, was never
adopted. 8
Upon assuming control, the Derg immediately suspended
Micheau, The 1991 TransitionalCharterof Ethiopia: A New Application of the Self-Determination Principle?, 28 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 367, 380-81 (1996).

8. MatthewJ. McCracken, Abusing Self-Determination and Democracy: How the TPLFis
Looting Ethiopia, 36 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 183, 189 (2004).
9. See Wigger, supra note 2, at 392, 394; John W. Van Doren, Positivism and the Rule
of Law, Formal Systems or Concealed Values: A Case Study of the Ethiopian Legal System, 3J.
TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 165, 184-86 (1994).

10. See Wigger, supra note 2, at 394; Van Doren, supra note 9, at 184-86.
11. See Wigger, supra note 2, at 394; Van Doren, supra note 9, at 184-86.
12. See Wigger, supra note 2, at 394; Van Doren, supra note 9, at 184-86.
13. FEDERAL RESEARCH DIVISION, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, COUNTRY STUDIES,

A COUN-

TRY STUDY: ETHIOPIA (2005), http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/ettoc.html, at The Attempted

Coup of 1960 and Its Aftermath, http://cweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@
field(DOCID+et0038) [hereinafter ETHIOPIA COUNTRY STUDY].
14. See Wigger, supra note 2, at 394-95.
15. See Kemal Bedri & Elena Baylis, Constructing Credibility, 6 GREEN BAG 2D 399,

399 (2003); Derege Demissie, Self-Determination IncludingSecession vs. the TerritorialIntegrity of Nation-States: A PrimaFacie Case for Secession, 20 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 165,

181 (1996); McCracken, supra note 8, at 190; Wigger, supra note 2, at 397; Micheau,
supra note 7, at 375; Paul, supra note 2, at 239; Van Doren, supra note 9, at 169-70.
16. See ETHIOPIA COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 13, at The Establishment of the Derg,

http://Icweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+t038).
17. See id.
18. See id.

2008]

SILENCING THE ETHIOPIAN COURTS

263

the revised 1955 Constitution' 9 and systematically eradicated all
dissent.2 ° The Derg carried out arbitrary arrests and detentions,
torture, and extrajudicial executions of political opponents and
opposition elements. 21 Major Mengistu Haile Marium maintained tight control of the Derg 22 while Ethiopia operated with23
out a constitution for twelve years.
The Derg established the Constitution of the People's Democratic Republic of Ethiopia in 1987.24 The Constitution, which
purported to espouse a commitment to basic freedoms and
rights, was belied by the Derg's massive human rights violations.

25

During the Derg's reign, the combination of drought, corruption, mismanagement, and the forced resettlement of 1.5
million Ethiopians led to widespread famine and impoverishment. 26 Internal and external military operations, including internal insurgencies in Tigray and Eritrea, as well as Somalia's attempted annexation of the Ethiopian region of Ogaden, contributed to the virtual bankruptcy of the government. 27 As a result,
the Tigray People's Liberation Front ("TPLF") joined with other
ethnic groups to form the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary
Democratic Front ("EPRDF"), which, together with the Eritrean
People's Liberation Front ("EPLF"), brought about the demise
28
of the Derg on May 28, 1991, Ethiopia's National Day.
The EPRDF established the Transitional Government of
Ethiopia ("TGE"), headed by TPLF leader Meles Zenawi, as well
as a transitional charter that included important human rights
19. See Wigger, supra note 2, at 397; Van Doren, supra note 9, at 170, 186.
20. See Herther-Spiro, supra note 1, at 334-35; McCracken, supra note 8, at 190-92;
Wigger, supra note 2, at 398.
21. See Herther-Spiro, supra note 1, at 334-35; McCracken, supra note 8, at 190-92;
Wigger, supra note 2, at 398; Paul, supra note 2, at 244.
22. See McCracken, supra note 8, at 189-90; Wigger, supra note 2, at 397-98; Paul,
supra note 2, at 240; Van Doren, supra note 8, at 169-70.
23. See Van Doren, supra note 9, at 169-70, 186.
24. See id. at 186.
25. See ETHIOPIA COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 13, at Citizenship, Freedoms, Rights, and
Duties, http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+etO130).
26. See Wigger, supra note 2, at 397-99.
27. See McCracken, supra note 8, at 190-92.
28. See Baylis, supra note 2, at 568; Demissie, supra note 15, at 181; McCracken,
supra note 8, at 183-84, 190-92; Richard A. Rosen, ConstitutionalProcess, Constitutionalism,
and the EritreanExperience, 24 N.C.J. Int'l & Com. Reg. 263, 273 (1999); Selassie, supra
note 1, at 63; Van Doren, supra note 9, at 170; Interview with Fasil Nahum, supra note 1.
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provisions. 29 The transitional charter fully recognized freedom
of speech and the press." The charter also established the
group right to self-determination," 1 which led the Oromo Liberation Front and the Ogaden National Liberation Front3 to mount
insurgencies3 2 and Eritrea to vote to secede in 1993. 1
Under the EPRDF's provisional government, dominated by
the TPLF, the Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic
of Ethiopia (the FDRE Constitution) was adopted in 1994 and
came into force in 1995.1 4 The EPRDF comprised approximately eighty-five percent of the Constitutional Assembly which
enacted the Constitution. 35 The 1995 FDRE Constitution is Ethiopia's most progressive and comprehensive Constitution in
terms of fundamental rights and freedoms. 36 One-third of the
Constitution is devoted to the recognition and protection of
human rights.3 7 It also establishes human rights institutions,
In
such as an Ombudsman and a Human Rights Commission.
addition to individual human rights, the Constitution espouses a
commitment to ethnic group rights.3 9
The FDRE Constitution is anchored by the concept of eth29. See Anonymous, Human Rights in the Horn of Africa, 11 IND. INT'L & CoMp. L.
REV. 543, 548-52 (2001); Bedri & Baylis, supra note 15, at 399; Herther-Spiro, supra note
1, at 335; McCracken, supra note 8, at 183-84, 190-92; Van Doren, supra note 9, at 170,
187.
30. See Haile, The New Ethiopian Constitution, supra note 1, at 8.
31. See Hum. Rts. Watch, Eritrea & Ethiopia: The Horn of Africa War: Mass Expulsions and the Nationality Issue 12 (Jan. 2003), http://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/
ethioeritOlO3/ethioerit03.pdf.
32. See Herther-Spiro, supra note 1, at 365; McCracken, supra note 8, at 198-201;
Selassie, supra note 1, at 84.
33. See Herther-Spiro, supra note 1, at 335; McCracken, supra note 8, at 183, 19192; Wigger, supra note 2, at 399; Rosen, supra note 28, at 273.
34. See Haile, The New Ethiopian Constitution, supra note 1, at 9; Herther-Spiro, supra
note 1, at 335; McCracken, supra note 8, at 183-84, 189-93; Wigger, supra note 2, at 399.
35. See Anonymous, supra note 29, at 549. The opposing political parties refused
to participate in Constitutional Assembly elections because they had been excluded
from participating in the drafting of the 1995 Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia
("FDRE") Constitution. See id.; Haile, The New Ethiopian Constitution, supra note 1, at 9.
The Oromo, Ethiopia's largest ethnic group which comprised 40% of the population,
left the transitional government and had no hand in writing Ethiopia's Constitution. See
Baylis, supra note 2 at 547, 550.
36. See Herther-Spiro, supra note 1, at 345-47; McCracken, supra note 8, at 183-84;
Twibell, supra note 1, at 399-409, 438-46.
37. See Haile, The New Ethiopian Constitution, supra note 1, at 53; see also Twibell,
supra note 1, at 439 & n.296 (stating half).
38. ETH. CoNsT. art. 55 §§ 14-15; see Twibell, supra note 1, at 443.
39. See Selassie, supra note 1, at 54-55, 64-68; Interview with Fasil Nahum, supra
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nic federalism, which constitutionalizes Ethiopia's ethnic diversity and recognizes the various ethnic groups as units of self-government, or "Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples" ("NN&P"),
with powers to secede or form their own states within the Federal
Democratic Republic of Ethiopia.4 ° According to the 1995
FDRE Constitution, sovereignty rests not with the people or individual citizens of Ethiopia, but with the NN&P of Ethiopia.4 1
The Constitutional Assembly's ostensible reasoning for constitutionalizing ethnic federalism was its desire to maintain Ethiopia's unity while ensuring equality among Ethiopia's various
ethnic groups and providing a political mechanism for dissipating ethnic tensions.4 2 There are advantages and disadvantages
to ethnic federalism. 43 Some argue that a federal government
with constitutional recognition of both ethnic group diversity
and equality not only allows for national integration and political legitimacy but provides a political framework for harmonious
co-existence.4 4 Others argue that such an emphasis on ethnic
divisions, along with an easy means of secession, only entrenches
the psychological barriers that separate ethnic groups.4 5 While
note 1; see also Demissie, supra note 15, at 183; Herther-Spiro, supra note 1, at 332-33,
345-48; McCracken, supra note 8, at 183-84, 189-94.
40. ETH. CONST. pmbl., art. 39; see Baylis, supra note 2, at 558; Herther-Spiro, supra
note 1, at 323, 345-48. The Federation currently consists of nine states, which aim to
broadly and roughly represent the delineations between ethnic groups in Ethiopia.
The Constitution describes a Nation, Nationality, or People as a group of persons with a
common culture, a common language, a predominantly contiguous territory, a common identity, and a common psychological make-up. ETH. CONST. art. 39 § 5; see Selassie, supra note 1, at 54-55, 58-59, 61, 63-68; Interview with Fasil Nahum, supra note 1; see
also McCracken, supra note 8, at 183-84, 193.
41. ETH. CONST. pmbl; see Selassie, supra note 1, at 54-55, 63-68; Interview with Fasil
Nahum, supra note 1; see also Baylis, supra note 2, at 560; Demissie, supra note 15, at 183;
Herther-Spiro, supra note 1, at 345-48; McCracken, supra note 8, at 183-84, 193; Makau
Wa Mutua, The Politics of Human Rights: Beyond the Abolitionist Paradigm in Africa, 17
MICH. J. INT'L L. 591, 603-04, 611-12 (1996).
42. See Selassie, supra note 1, at 63-68; Interview with Fasil Nahum, supra note 1; see
also Baylis, supra note 2, at 548-61; Demissie, supra note 15, at 181-83; Herther-Spiro,
supra note 1, at 329-32, 345, 348; McCracken, supra note 8, at 183-84, 189-93; Mutua,
supra note 41, at 603-04, 611-12.
43. See Selassie, supra note 1, at 53-55, 63-68; see also Baylis, supra note 2, at 548-56,
558-59; Demissie, supra note 15, at 181-83; Herther-Spiro, supra note 1, at 329-32, 345;
Wigger, supra note 2, at 401.
44. See Selassie, supra note 1, at 53-55, 64-68; Interview with Fasil Nahum, supra
note 1; see also Demissie, supra note 15, at 181-83; Herther-Spiro, supra note 1, at 329-32,
345, 348; McCracken, supra note 8, at 183-84, 189-93; Mutua, supra note 41, at 603-04,
611-12.
45. See Selassie, supra note 1, at 53; see also Baylis, supra note 2, at 548-56, 558-59;
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Ethiopia's ethnic groups are arranged in a somewhat geographical pattern, espouse varying religious beliefs, and speak separate
languages, intermarriage and the transference of cultural practices over centuries and millennia have eradicated most ethnic
differences.4 6 Yet, these emotional ties to community foster a
deep and inveterate identity with one's ethnic group.4 7
In addition to the constitutionalization of ethnic federalism,
the other hallmark of the 1995 FDRE Constitution is the vast
array of rights it espouses, including both individual human
rights and ethnic group rights. 4 Chapter III of the FDRE Constitution includes a detailed and comprehensive list of enumerated fundamental rights and freedoms, including human rights
and democratic rights.49 These rights and freedoms include the
right to life; security of person; liberty; protections against arbitrary arrest and detention; the right to trial; equality before the
law; and privacy. 50 Additionally, Chapter III of the Constitution
includes prohibitions against a number of forms of discrimination, as well as protections for freedom of religion, belief, and
opinion.5 1 The enumerated democratic rights include freedom
of expression, assembly, association, and movement. 52 Article 39
includes the right of secession for any NN&P of Ethiopia. 53 Article 41 enumerates economic, social and cultural rights. 54 Article
Demissie, supra note 15, at 181-83; Herther-Spiro, supra note 1, at 329-32, 348; McCracken, supra note 8, at 183-84, 189-93; Wigger, supra note 2, at 401; Mutua, supra note
41, at 603-04, 611-12; Jerome Wilson, Ethnic Groups and the Right to Self-Determination, 11
CONN. J. INT'L L. 433, 484 (1996).
46. See Selassie, supra note 1, at 59; Herther-Spiro, supra note 1, at 333.
47. See Selassie, supra note 1, at 59.
48. See Haile, The New Ethiopian Constitution, supra note 1, at 53-54; Interview with
Fasil Nahum, supra note 1; see also Herther-Spiro, supra note 1, at 345-48; McCracken,
supra note 8, at 195; Twibell, supra note 1, at 399409, 424-31, 438-46.
49. ETH. CONST. ch. 3; see Interview with Fasil Nahum, supra note 1; see also
Herther-Spiro, supra note 1, at 345-48; McCracken, supra note 8, at 195; Twibell, sujira
note 1, at 438-46. But see Twibell, supra note 1, at 425-28, 438-46 (discussing the downfalls of specifically enumerating these rights).
50. ETH. CONsT. arts. 14-17, 19-20, 25-26; see also Haile, The New Ethiopian Constitution, supra note 1, at 53.
51. ETH. CONST. arts. 25, 27, 38; see also Haile, The New Ethiopian Constitution, supra
note 1, at 53; McCracken, supra note 8, at 195; Interview with Fasil Nahum, supra note 1.
52. ETH. CONST. arts. 29-32; see Haile, The New Ethiopian Constitution, supra note 1,
at 53; Herther-Spiro, supra note 1, at 345-48; McCracken, supra note 8, at 195.
53. ETH. CONs-r. art. 39; see Herther-Spiro, supra note 1, at 34548; McCracken,
supra note 8, at 183-84, 189-93, 195.
54. ETH. CONST. art. 41; see generally Rakeb Messele, supra note 1, at 28-36.
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44 addresses environmental rights.5 5
The 1995 FDRE Constitution also embraces a system of nonjudicial constitutional review. The Constitutional Assembly had
originally proposed a constitutional court which would have had
the power to review the constitutionality of parliamentary and
executive action. 56 In fact, the Ethiopian Constitution still contains an empty provision directing the HOF to establish a Constitutional Court. 57 However, at a certain point during the drafting, the framers decided that the court should become an advisory committee, and the HOF should have the power of
constitutional interpretation.58
According to scholars, constitutional drafters, legal experts,
and judges, the Constitutional Assembly opted to have the HOF
interpret the Constitution rather than the judiciary for several
9
reasons. The first reason has its roots in ethnic federalism. 5
The framers viewed the Constitution as "a political contract,"
among the NN&P and therefore believed it is only representatives of the ethnic groups who have the power to interpret the
contract."0 The logic is that since the NN&P created the government to represent their interests, those groups alone should retain the power of constitutional interpretation. 6 ' The framers
took what they saw as a political power, and vested it in a political
body, the HOF, charged with representing the interests of the
55. ETH. CONST. art. 44. But see Twibell, supra note 1, at 443 (deriding this provision as "fashionable").
56. See Interview with Getahun Kassa, Expert on the Council of Constitutional Inquiry, in Addis Ababa, Eth. (Mar. 25, 2008); see also Interview with Assefa Fiseha, Professor of Law, Addis Ababa University Faculty of Law, in Addis Ababa, Eth. (Mar. 25,
2008); Interview with Fasil Nahum, supra note 1.
57. ETH. CONST. art. 62(2).
58. See Interview with Getahun Kassa, supra note 56; see also Interview with Assefa
Fiseha, supra note 56; Interview with Fasil Nahum, supra note 1; Interview with Tilahun
Teshome, Professor of Law, Addis Ababa University Faculty of Law, in Addis Ababa,
Eth. (Mar. 27, 2008).
59. See Assefa Fiseha, Federalismand the Adjudication of ConstitutionalIssues: The Ethiopian Experience, 52 NETH. IN-r'L L. REv. 1, 4 n.7 (2005) [hereinafter Federalism and Adjudication]; Interview with Getahun Kassa, supra note 56; Interview with Fasil Nahum,
supra note 1.
60. See Interview with Assefa Fiseha, supra note 56; Interview with Anonymous,
High Court Judge, in Addis Ababa, Eth. (Mar. 26, 2008).
61. See Federalism and Adjudication, supra note 59, at 16; Interview with Assefa
Fiseha, supra note 56; Interview with Getahun Kassa, supra note 56; Interview with Fasil
Nahum, supra note 1 ("They say it is our constitution, therefore, it is we who should
interpret it.").
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NN&P. 62

The Constitutional Assembly may have also feared 'judicial
activism" or creation of a 'judicial dictatorship" that would override the will of the NN&P if the judiciary were charged with constitutional interpretation.6 3 In addition, some argue that the
Ethiopian people did not trust the judiciary because centralized
executive power under Selassie and the Derg had stunted the
development of a well-functioning judiciary capable of conducting judicial review.6 4 The framers seemed to assume (and
one might argue desire) that the judiciary would remain the
weakest branch of the government.
Despite the establishment of the new government and Constitution after the toppling of the Derg, the EPRDF ruling party
has been the target of criticism for its human rights record.6 5 In
May 2005, parliamentary elections were held in which major opposition parties participated, and voter turnout was high.66 Immediately following the elections, the opposition parties accused
the EPRDF of tampering with the election results.6 7 Prime Minister Meles Zenawi banned all demonstrations, but protests occurred nonetheless.6 8 In June 2005, 9000 supporters of the leading opposition party, the Coalition for Unity and Democracy
("CUD"), many of whom were students, were arrested.6 9 Human
rights advocates, lawyers, academics, and journalists were also
62. See, e.g., FASIL NAHUM, CONSTITUTION FOR A NATION OF NATIONS: THE ETHIOPIAN PROSPECT 74 (1997) [hereinafter THE ETHIOPIAN PROSPECT]; Interview with Assefa

Fiseha, supra note 56; Interview with Fasil Nahum, supra note 1; Interview with Eshetu
W. Semayat, Ministry of Justice Official, in Addis Ababa, Eth. (Mar. 26, 2008).
63. See Interview with Assefa Fiseha, supra note 56; Interview with Fasil Nahum,
supra note 1.
64. See Interview with Fasil Nahum, supra note 1.
65. See, e.g., Anonymous, supra note 29, at 548-51; Chaloka Belanyi, Recent Developments in the African Human Rights System 2004-2006, United Nations and Regional Human
Rights Systems: Recent Development, 7 HUM. RTS. L. REv. 582, 591-92 (2007); HertherSpiro, supra note 1, at 337-38, 364-67; McCracken, supra note 8, at 183-84, 189-93, 195;
Mutua, supra note 41, at 603-04, 611-12; Selassie, supra note 1, at 63-68, 75, 78-79;
Twibell, supra note 1, at 426-27, 438-46; Wigger, supra note 2, at 399-401.
66. See Herther-Spiro, supra note 1, at 337-38, 364-67; see also Amnesty Int'l, Ethiopia: Prisoners of Conscience on Trial for Treason: Opposition Party Leaders, Human
Rights Defenders and Journalists 2-3 (May 2, 2006), http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/AFR25/013/2006/en/dom-AFR250132006en.pdf [hereinafter Prisoners of
Conscience].
67. See Prisonersof Conscience, supra note 661, at 3; see also Herther-Spiro, supra note
1, at 337, 364-67.
68. See Prisoners of Conscience, supra note 661, at 3.
69. See id. at 3.
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imprisoned.7" Ethiopian security forces shot and killed forty-two
people and wounded 200 during demonstrations in Addis Ababa
in November 2005."' Approximately 10,000 more demonstrators
and supporters were arrested.7 2 The CUD party believes that several thousand of its members and supporters have been held in
prisons throughout the country without charge since 2005. 7" In
May 2006, 111 defendants, including members of four political
opposition parties, faced charges of treason, genocide, armed
conspiracy, and outrages against the Constitution." In addition,
twenty-five people were tried in absentia.7 5 In April 2007, twentyeight of those charged were freed when the presiding judge determined that the government had not established sufficient
cases against those defendants. 76 Without having presented a
defense, thirty-eight were convicted in July 2007.77 These thirtyeight were then pardoned and released on July 20, 2007.78 Of
those who had been charged, the last two prisoners were recently released.7 9
II. HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE 1995 FDRE
ETHIOPIAN CONSTITUTION
A. Incorporationof InternationalHuman Rights Instruments
into Ethiopian Law
Article 9(4) of the 1995 FDRE Constitution states that, "[a]ll
international agreements ratified by Ethiopia are an integral
70. See id. at 2-3, 5, 7.
71. See id. at 4; see also Belanyi, supra note 65, at 591-92; Herther-Spiro, supra note
1, at 364-67.
72. See Prisonersof Conscience, supra note 66, at 4; see also Herther-Spiro, supra note
1, at 364-67.
73. See Prisonersof Conscience, supra note 66, at 4.
74. See id. at 1.
75. See id. at 17.
76. See generally Amnesty Int'l, Background: Ethiopia Releases 38 Prisoners of Conscience (July 20, 2007), http://www.amnestyusa.org/all-countries/ethiopia/background-information-victo ry-ethiopia-reeases38-prisoners-of-conscience/page.do?id=
l181002&nl=3&n2=30&n3=902 [hereinafter Ethiopia Releases].
77. See Ethiopia: PoliticalRepression Must Stop, (Amnesty Int'l, London, U.K.), Aug.
2007, available at http://www.amnestyusa.org/document.php?id=ENGAFR250132007&
lang=e.
78. See generally Ethiopia Releases, supra note 76.
79. See generallyAmnesty Int'l, Activists Released From Prison in Ethiopia (Mar. 31,
2008), http://www.amnesty.org/en/news-and-updates/good-news/activists-releasedprison-ethiopia-20080331.
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part of the law of the land."8 The current debate regarding incorporation of international human rights instruments into Ethiopian law is whether ratification alone suffices for domestication
or whether publication in the Federal Negarit Gazeta ("Federal
Gazette") (the official law gazette of the federal government) is
required.8 1 Despite the explicit nature of Article 9(4), opponents to incorporation solely through ratification point to the
existence of a provision in Article 71(2), describing the powers
and functions of the President, which reads, "[h] e shall proclaim
in the Negarit Gazeta laws and international agreements approved by the House of Peoples' Representatives in accordance
with the Constitution."82 Those who argue that publication in
the Federal Gazette is a requirement for incorporation also
point to Proclamation 3, adopted in 1995, which reads, "all federal or regional legislative, executive and judicial organs as well
as any natural or juridical person shall take judicial notice of
Laws published in the federal Negarit Gazeta."83 Yet, there is
nothing in the proclamation or the articles of the Constitution,
which indicates that publication is a requirement for incorporation."

The issue of publication in the Federal Negarit Gazeta is
one of practicality, not legality.8 5 Publication of human rights
treaties in the Federal Gazette would improve access to and comprehension of these instruments and empower the courts to invoke them.8" Publication of the entire text of any international
human rights covenant or treaty as an official Amharic8 7 translation subsequent to ratification followed by the implementation
of national legislation is ideal, but it is not an express requirement of the Constitution.8 8 Thus far, Ethiopia has ratified most
of the major international human rights instruments but has
80. ETH. CONST. art. 9 § 4; see Haile, ComparingHuman Rights in Two Ethiopian Constitutions, supra note 1, at 26-29; Messele, supra note 1, at 15; see also Herther-Spiro, supra
note 1, at 352-53; Haile, New Ethiopian Constitution, supra note 1, at 45-50.
81. See Messele, supra note 1 at 15.
82. ETH. CONST. art. 71 § 2; see Messele, supra note 1 at 15.
83. A Proclamation to Provide for the Establishment of the Federal Negarit
Gazeta, Proc. No. 3, art. 2 § 3 (1995) (Eth.); see Messele, supra note 1, at 15.
84. See Messele, supra note 1, at 15.
85. See id. at 15, 25, 39.
86. See id. at 39.
87. Amharic is the official language of Ethiopia. See U.S. DEPT. OF ST., BACKGROUND NOTE: ETHIOPIA (2008), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2859.htm.
88. See Messele, supra note 1, at 25.
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published only one, the Convention on the Rights of the Child
("CRC"). 89 However, not a single line of the actual text of the
CRC was published or officially translated.9 ° Its publication was
but a single sentence in the Federal Gazette indicating that it was
henceforth considered as published.9
B. Status of InternationalHuman Rights Instruments with Respect to
the Ethiopian Constitution
Another subject of debate is the status of international
human rights instruments with respect to the Constitution.9 2 Article 9(1) of the FDRE Constitution states that the Constitution is
the supreme law of the land.9" It continues by stating that any
law which contravenes the Constitution is null and void.94 Article 9(4) describes ratified international treaties as an integral
part of the law of the land, but not the supreme law of the
land. 95 It would appear that the Constitution takes precedence
over any ratified international human rights instruments; however, Article 13(2) of the Constitution includes a provision,
which arguably places certain international human rights instruments on par with the Constitution.9 6 Article 13(2) reads:
"[t]he fundamental rights and freedoms specified in this Chapter shall be interpreted in a manner conforming to the principles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, International Covenants on Human Rights and international instruments adopted by Ethiopia."9 7 One could argue that a
constitutional requirement to interpret in conformity with the
89. See Herther-Spiro, supra note 1, at 352-53; Messele, supra note 1, at 25, 40; see
also Paul, supra note 2, at 236-37.
90. See Messele, supra note 1, at 25.
91. See id.
92. See Haile, ComparingHuman Rights in Two Ethiopian Constitutions, supra note 1,
at 26-29; Haile, New Ethiopian Constitution, supra note 1, at 45-50; Messele, supra note 1,
at 15; see also Twibell, supra note 1, at 409.
93. ETH. CONST. art. 9 § 1; see Haile, ComparingHuman Rights in Two Ethiopian Constitutions, supra note 1, at 26-29; Messele, supra note 1, at 15; see also Haile, New Ethiopian
Constitution, supra note 1, at 45-50; Twibell, supra note 1, at 409.
94. ETH. CONST. art. 9 § 1; see Haile, ComparingHuman Rights in Two Ethiopian Constitutions, supra note 1, at 26-29; Haile, New Ethiopian Constitution, supra note 1,at 45-50;
Messele, supra note 1, at 15; see also Twibell, supra note 1, at 409.
95. ETH. CONST. art. 9 § 4; see Messele, supra note 1, at 38.
96. ETH. CONST. art. 13 § 2; see Messele, supra note 1, at 15.
97. ETH. CONST. art. 13 § 2; see Haile, Comparing Human Rights in Two Ethiopian
Constitutions, supra note 1, at 26-29; see also Haile, New Ethiopian Constitution, supra note
1, at 45-50; Herther-Spiro, supra note 1, at 352-53; Twibell, supra note 1, at 409.
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aforementioned international human rights instruments places
these instruments on par with the Constitution.9 8 Yet some
scholars argue that providing guidelines for interpreting the
Constitution is far removed from establishing international
human rights instruments as the supreme law of the land.9 9
Article 93 of the Constitution illustrates the problem which
arises if international human rights instruments are not considered on par with the Constitution. Article 93 describes procedures for times of emergency, including which fundamental
rights and freedoms are derogable. l0 0 Article 93 provides that
all fundamental rights and freedoms are derogable during a
state of emergency, except for Articles 18 (prohibition on cruel,
inhuman, or degrading treatment), 25 (equality before the law),
and 39(1) and (2) (ethnic group rights). 1 ' This list shockingly
does not include the right to life.' °2 This fact alone seems to
demand that certain international human rights instruments are
on par with the Constitution; otherwise, the federal government
would have a constitutional basis for violating a citizen's right to
life during a state of emergency.10 3
III. CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION IN ETHIOPIA
A. The Players
Ethiopia's federal and state governments possess distinct responsibilities, and each level has its own constitution and executive, legislative, and judicial branches. 104 The legislative branch
of the government consists of two houses of parliament.0 5 The
two houses of parliament are the House of People's Representa98. See Haile, Comparing Human Rights in Two Ethiopian Constitutions, supra note 1,
at 26-29; see also Haile, New Ethiopian Constitution, supra note 1, at 45-50; Twibell, supra

note 1, at 409.
99. See Haile, Comparing Human Rights in Two Ethiopian Constitutions, supra note 1,
at 26-29; Messele, supra note 1 at 39; see also Haile, New Ethiopian Constitution, supra note

1, at 45-50; Twibell, supra note 1, at 409.
100. ETH. CONST. art. 93; see Haile, ComparingHuman Rights in Two Ethiopian Constitutions, supra note 1, at 29-32; Haile, New Ethiopian Constitution, supra note 1, at 45-50.
101. ETH. CONST. art. 93; see Haile, ComparingHuman Rights in Two Ethiopian Constitutions, supra note 1, at 29-32; Haile, New Ethiopian Constitution, supra note 1, at 45-50.
102. See Haile, Comparing Human Rights in Two Ethiopian Constitutions,supra note 1,
at 30-31; Haile, New Ethiopian Constitution, supra note 1, at 48.
103. See Haile, New Ethiopian Constitution, supra note 1, at 49.
104. ETH. CONST. art. 50.
105. Id. art. 53.
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tives ("HOPR") and the HOF. 10 6 The HOPR is the law-making
body, which represents the individual citizens of Ethiopia. 10 7
The HOPR elects the executive branch, the Council of Ministers
and the Prime Minister from among its members.'0 8 The
EPRDF currently holds approximately two-thirds of the seats in
the HOPR.'0 9 Both the state and federal governments have independent judiciaries. 10 The Federal Supreme Court is the
highest court in the land, however, the HOF along with the
Council of Constitutional Inquiry ("CCI") are responsible for
constitutional interpretation."'
1. House of Federation
The HOF is a representative organ of parliament whose
members come from every ethnic group.1 12 Since the HOF represents all the NN&P of Ethiopia, it is seen as the body with the
duty to resolve conflicts, foster cooperation and ensure equality
between Ethiopia's numerous ethnic groups."' Each ethnic
group is represented in the HOF by one member with an additional representative per million of its population." 4 The HOF
is also responsible for mediating disputes between states and between states and the federal government; overseeing any attempts at self-determination or secession; and allocating the federal budget among the states." 5 Most importantly, the HOF is
the organ of the federal government that is constitutionally mandated to settle constitutional disputes a16 and interpret the Con106. Id.
107. Id. arts. 54-55. The members of the House of People's Representatives serve
five year terms. Id. art. 54. There are approximately 530 members. See ETH. CONsT. art.
54 § 3; Haile, New Ethiopian Constitution, supra note 1, at 13.
108. ETH. CONsT. arts. 55 § 13, 73.
109. See Ctr. for Strategic and Int'l Studies, Ethiopia in 2005: The Beginning of a
Transition? 3 (2006), http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/anotes0601.pdf [hereinafter Beginning of a Transition]. Prior to the 2005 elections, they held approximately
ninety percent of the seats. See id. at 2.
110. ETH. CONST. art. 78.
111. Id. arts. 80, 84.
112. Id. art. 61.
113. Id. arts. 61-62.
114. Id. art. 61. The members of the House of Federation ("HOF") are either
elected by the State Councils or the State Council can hold elections to have the representatives elected by the people. Id.
115. Id. art. 62.
116. Id. art. 83 § 1.
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stitution."17 The HOF's final decision regarding a constitutional
dispute is considered law to be applied in similar cases that arise
in the future." 8 Two parliamentary proclamations (Proclamations 250 and 251) adopted in 2001 clarify the role played by the
HOF in regard to constitutional interpretation." 9 The HOF is
to interpret the Constitution according to the principles of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, International Covenants of Human Rights, and other adopted international instruments. 12' The HOF organizes the CCI, which plays an advisory
12
role to the HOF in constitutional interpretation.'
2. Council of Constitutional Inquiry
The CCI is the legal advisory body to the House of Federation.122 The CCI is comprised of eleven members who include
the President and Vice President of the Federal Supreme Court;
three persons designated by the House of Federation from
among its members; and six legal experts appointed by the Presi12
dent of the Republic with the recommendation of the HOPR. 1
The function of the CCI is to assist the HOF in deciding constitutional disputes and to discard cases in which no constitutional
interpretation is required. 1 24 Because CCI is merely an advisory
body its recommendations are non-binding. 125 According to Article 84 of the Constitution, any federal or state court and any
117. Id. art. 62 § 1.
118. A Proclamation to Consolidate the House of the Federation of the Federal
Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and to Define Its Powers and Responsibilities, Proc.
No. 251, art. 11 § 1 (2001) (Eth.), available at http://www.hofethiopia.org/pdf/PROCLAMATION NO_251_2001.pdf [hereinafter Proclamation 251].
119. Proclamation 250 elucidates how a court or an individual goes about submitting a constitutional issue to the Council. Council of Constitutional Inquiry Proclamation, Proc. No. 250 (2001) (Eth.), available at http://www.hofethiopia.org/pdf/PROCLAMATIONNO_250_2001.pdf [hereinafter Proclamation 250]. Proclamation 251 expounds upon the way in which constitutional questions reach the HOF via the Council
of Constitutional Inquiry ("CCI"). Proclamation 251, supra note 118. Part Two, Articles
4-18, elaborates upon the way in which the HOF shall engage in constitutional interpretation. Id. arts. 4-18.
120. Proclamation 251, supra note 118, art. 7 § 2. These include the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic,
Social, and Cultural Rights.
121. Id. art. 3 § 2, 5 § 1.
122. ETH. CONST. arts. 83, 84 § 1.

123. Id. art. 82.
124. Id. art. 84.
125. See id. § 1.
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interested party, be it an individual, organization, nation, or
state, may submit a constitutional challenge to either a state or
federal law to the CCI. 1 26 Proclamations 250 and 251 extend the
power of constitutional interpretation to include all proclamations, regulations and directives issued by the federal and state
government and international agreements that have been ratified by Ethiopia. 127 Essentially, all acts of the legislature and the
executive are subject to constitutional interpretation by the CCI
and HOF.
3. Courts
The courts are required to submit cases to the CCI and
HOF if they believe that there is a need for constitutional interpretation. 1 28 If a constitutional dispute exists, the court adjudicating the case does not have the jurisdiction to further investigate or render a ruling on the issue of constitutionality. 129 While
the courts are loathe to do anything which might indicate that
they are engaged in constitutional interpretation, they do have a
duty to enforce the Constitution's fundamental rights and freedoms, and the principle of precedent, recently established
within the Ethiopian judiciary, may assist them in doing so.' 30
The Court of Cassation recently invoked the Child Rights Convention in a precedent-setting decision.13 1 While there is some
debate as to the extent of its application, the decision clearly
indicated that courts have both the right and the duty to invoke
32
international human rights instruments in their decisions.'
However, despite this breakthrough, courts may still fear citing
international human rights instruments in their decisions. In in126. See id. § 2.
127. Proclamation 251, supra note 118, art. 2 § 2; Proclamation 250, supra note
119, art. 2 § 5.
128. Proclamation 250, supra note 119, art. 21; see Haile, ComparingHuman Rights
in Two Ethiopian Constitutions, supra note 1, at 55.
129. Proclamation 250, supra note 119, art. 21; see Haile, ComparingHuman Rights
in Two Ethiopian Constitutions, supra note 1, at 55.
130. See Messele, supra note 1, at 26; A Proclamation To Reamend The Federal
Courts Proclamation Number 25/1996, Proc. No. 454, (2005) (Eth.), available at
http://www.ethiopar.net/type/Amharic/2term5y/2t5y/hopre/bills/I 997/454ae.pdf.
131. See generally Ethiopia: Child Forum Backs Court Decision Over CRC Implementation,
THE DAILY MONITOR (Addis Ababa, Eth.), Mar. 11, 2008, available at http://allafrica.
com/stories/200803111224.html.
132. See Haile, ComparingHuman Rights in Two Ethiopian Constitutions, supra note 1,
at 54-59; Twibell, supra note 1, at 409, 418-21, 438-46.
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voking an international human rights instrument, a court could
conceivably be triggering the need for constitutional interpretation in its very invocation, requiring a referral to the HOF.
B. The Process
When the HOF receives a case involving a constitutional dispute, it first forwards the case to the CCI. 13 3 According to Article
20 of Proclamation 250, the CCI may "develop and implement
principles of constitutional interpretation" which it believes will
be helpful in determining if there is a constitutional question at
issue.'
The CCI then investigates the issue.' 35 The CCI may
remand a case to the lower courts if it finds that there is no need
for constitutional interpretation.1 36 If the CC rejects a case
based on a finding that there is no constitutional dispute, and a
party to the case is dissatisfied with this ruling, the party may
appeal directly to the HOF within sixty days from the receipt of
the CCI's decision. 1 37 The courts, non-governmental organizations, and individuals can all submit cases to the CCI for adjudication. - s
If the CCI finds that there is indeed a valid constitutional
dispute and interpretation is necessary, the CCI legally analyzes
the constitutional question and provides a non-binding advisory
recommendation to the HOF.139 The HOF must then make a
final decision within thirty days of the CCI's recommendation
regarding the constitutional dispute. 4 ° Since the CCI is an advisory body, the HOF is free to disregard the CCI's recommendations. 4' The HOF may further investigate any pertinent constitutional issues, or alternately, it may choose to call upon another
133. Proclamation 251, supra note 118, art. 6.
134. Proclamation 250, supra note 119, art. 20 § 1. Article 26 indicates that the
governmental body in question, when a law is in dispute, will have an opportunity and
an obligation to explain the constitutionality of the law. Id. art. 26. Article 27 provides
that the Council may call any other pertinent institutions, professionals, or organizations to testify or submit information as it deems necessary. Id. art. 27.
135. Id. art. 17 § 2.
136. ETH. CoNsT. art. 84 § 3.
137. Proclamation 250, supra note 119, art. 18. According to Proclamation 251,
however, the HOF is not obliged to respond to these appeals. It is only obliged to
respond to the CCI. See Proclamation 251, supra note 118, art. 5.
138. See Bedri & Baylis, supra note 15, at 400.
139. Proclamation 250, supra note 119, art. 17.
140. Proclamation 251, supra note 118, art. 13 § 2.
141. ETH. CONsT. arts. 83, 84 § 1.
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dispute and report back to the
body or organ to investigate the
14 2
decision.
final
its
HOF prior to
Both the HOF and the CCI have the capacity to review individual human rights cases pertaining to constitutional rights. As
stated in Article 84(2) of the Constitution, any court or interested party can submit a question of constitutional dispute to the
CCI which shall consider the matter and then submit it to the
HOF for a final decision. 14 1 In addition, under Proclamation
250, "[a]ny person who alleges that his fundamental rights and
freedoms have been violated by the final decision of any governmental institution or official may present his case to the CCI for
constitutional interpretation." 14 4 Before an applicant can submit an application to the CCI or HOF for review, however, the
individual is first required to exhaust all remedies and appeals
within the government institution or body that has allegedly violated his or her rights. 14 5 If the court in its final determination
holds that a constitutional question exists, the court then "rejects
the case" because they cannot interpret constitutional issues,
ninety
and the party can then submit the case to the CCI within
46
days from the receipt of the decision of the court.1
There is some debate regarding the exclusivity of the HOF's
authority over constitutional interpretation in relation to the
courts. The general consensus is that the courts can apply the
Constitution but have no power to interpret the Constitution. 4 7
Some scholars, however, have argued the contrary. 4 Assefa
Fiseha, a noted Ethiopian legal and constitutional scholar, argues that courts are mandated by the Constitution to enforce the
fundamental rights and freedoms enshrined in Chapter III of
the Constitution and that such enforcement cannot be achieved
without the courts engaging in constitutional interpretation."'
142. Proclamation 251, supra note 118, arts. 8-10. The HOF may also call upon
other government institutions, bodies, or organs, those responsible for enacting the law
in question, members of the court handling the case, the parties to the case and other
persons, institutions, or organizations that may be able to offer evidence pertinent to
the case, in order to make its final decision. Id.
143. See ETH. CONsT. art. 84 § 2.
144. Proclamation 250, supra note 119, art. 23 § 1.
145. Id. § 2.
146. Id. art. 22 § 3.
147. See Interview with Anonymous, supra note 60.
148. See Federalismand Adjudication, supra note 59, at 20-21.
149. Interview with Assefa Fiseha, supra note 56.
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This argument, though providing a theory upon which the present understanding of constitutional interpretation can be challenged, is not part of the general consensus regarding the
courts' role in constitutional interpretation. The dominant view
maintains that the FDRE Constitution and the HOF and CCI
Proclamations deny courts the power of judicial review and confine them to mere application of the laws as promulgated by the
legislature. 151 In addition, in practice, courts do not engage in
constitutional interpretation. 151
IV. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF COUNTRIES ENGAGED IN
NON-JUDICIAL CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW
The Ethiopian constitutional framers' decision to vest the
power of constitutional interpretation in a non-judicial body is
unusual. Worldwide, most political systems utilize some form of
judicial constitutional review, either by way of a supreme court
or a constitutional court.1 5 2 Many nations with systems of nonjudicial constitutional review do not have reputations for fostering democratic freedoms. Such nations include Bahrain,
Congo, Cuba, North Korea, and Zimbabwe.15 This Section will
describe the political systems in China and the former Soviet
Union, where non-judicial constitutional review contributes or
contributed to government repression. 1 54 It will also consider
Finland's political system, which stands as an anomaly among
countries engaged in nonjudicial constitutional review, in that
Finland generally fosters democratic representation and human
55
rights protections. 1
A. China
In China, the National People's Congress ("NPC"), along
with its Standing Committee ("SC"), are the highest political organs in the state 156 and have broad powers.1 57 Among the SC's
150. Interview with Anonymous, supra note 60.
151. Id.
152. See, e.g., Baylis, supra note 2, at 577-79.
153. See Francisco Ramos Romeu, The Establishment of Constitutional Courts: A Study
of 128 Democratic Constitutions, 2 REV. L. & EcoN. 103 n.1 (2006).
154. See id.
155. See infra Part C.
156. XIAN FA [Constitution] art. 57, § 1 (1982) (P.R.C.).
157. See id. arts. 58, 62-63.
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many functions is interpretation of the Chinese Constitution.' 5 8
The Chinese Constitution is the "fundamental law of the state
and has supreme legal authority."' 5 9 However, despite its power,
the SC has interpreted the constitution less than eight times in
fifty years. 160 In reality, the NPC and SC serve largely to validate
Chinese Communist Party ("CCP") mandates. 16 Many observers
have recommended the creation of a Chinese constitutional
court to help foster discussion of and adherence to constitu162
tional law.
Historically, China has not had a strong, independent judiciary. 16 ' Thejudiciary, along with most branches of government,
is connected to the CCP. 164 Judges in China face an enormous
amount of pressure to mold rulings to suit the whims of local
politicians, prosecutors, and national party officials.' 6 5 In addition, judges must refer conflict of laws cases to the SC.166 In
2003, Chinese judge Li Huijuan sparked national controversy
when she invalidated a provincial law because it violated national
law.' 67 The NPC characterized the decision as a "serious breach
of law."' 6 8 After the controversy over Judge Li's decision, the
NPC established a conflict of laws committee, which some con69
sider a nascent constitutional court.
In China there are few mechanisms to ensure that individ158. See id. art. 67; Cao Siyuan, Legal: Five Recommendationsfor Chinese Constitutional
Reform, 111(4) HARV. ASIA Q. (1999), available at http://www.asiaquarterly.com/content/view/46/40/.
159. XIAN FA pmbl. (1982) (P.R.C.); see also Steven L. Chan, Differences Between British and Chinese Views of Law Forebode Uncertaintiesfor Hong Kong's People After the 1997
Transfer, 15 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 138, 190 n.338 (1996) (noting that Chinese law is
secondary to the Constitution).
160. See, e.g.,
Hong Kong's Constitutional Debate: Conflict Over Interpretation
189-90 (Johannes M.M. Chan et al. eds., 2000) (citing varying numbers); Baylis, supra
note 2, at 577 n.155 (claiming the Standing Committee has never exercised its power).
161. See Chan, supra note 160, at 180-82.
162. See Siyuan, supra note 158; Veron Hung, China's Constitutional Amendment is
Fawed, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Mar. 5, 2004, at 8.
163. WONG KAI SHING, HUM. RTS. SOLIDARITY, CHINA: REFORMING CHINA'S JUDICIARY (2001), http://www.hrsolidarity.net/mainfile.php/2000vollOno06/555/.
164. See Chan, supra note 159, at 178. The author notes that this was true in the
former Soviet Union as well. See id.

165.
166.
28, 2005,
167.
168.
169.

See SHING, supra note 163.
See Jim Yardley, A Judge Tests China's Courts, Making History, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
at Al.
See id.
See id.
See id.
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ual and collective rights are formally recognized within criminal
and civil disputes. 7 ° Constitutional human rights directives
have little force without a mechanism to ensure legislative and
judicial observance. When limited numbers of government officials have the power to decide constitutional questions, it is unlikely they will engage in true constitutional review. Many Chinese political and judicial organs merely go through the motions
of protecting rights.1 7' Ethiopia must work to ensure that its political system does not create a facade for tyranny, but rather provides substantive review of government action.
B. The Former Soviet Union ("U.S.S.R. ")
The former Soviet Union ("U.S.S.R.") sought to maintain
control over the former Soviet empire, as well as spread communism, through ethnic federalism, which is the foundation of the
Ethiopian Constitution.' 7 2 The U.S.S.R.'s political system also
utilized non-judicial constitutional review."' In the U.S.S.R., the
Soviet of the Union and the Soviet of the Nationalities, the two
chambers of the Supreme Soviet, the highest legislative body of
the Soviet Union, could rule on the constitutionality of their
own legislation. 7 4 In practice, both Soviet parliamentary bodies'
constitutional review powers were largely ceremonial as they affirmed whatever laws were put before them.17 5
As in most Marxist countries, the Soviet judiciary was weak
by design.' 7 6 Marxists viewed the legal profession and the judici-

ary as bourgeois institutions and law as a tool of the ruling
class.' 77 The Soviets considered separation of powers unneces-

sary since each branch of government worked towards the common goal of furthering communism. 71 In a Marxist regime, the
170. See Randall Peerenboom, Assessing Human Rights in China: Why the Double
Standard?, 38 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 71, 147-48 (2005).
171. See supra notes 159-70 and accompanying text.
172. See Haile, Comparing Human Rights in Two Ethiopian Constitutions, supra note 1,
at 10-11.
173. See Konstitutsiia SSSR (1977) [Konst. SSSR] [USSR Constitution) art. 73 § 11.
174. See id. art. 121 § 5.
175. See Baylis, supra note 2, at 577 n.155.
176. See MAURO CAPALLETI, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD 7
(1971) (noting that the Soviets viewed judicial review of legislative activity as "bourgeois
doctrine").
177. See id.
178. See Anna M. Kuzmik, Rule of Law and Legal Reform in Ukraine: A Review of the
New Procuracy Law, 34 HARV. INT'L L.J. 611, 614 (1993).
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rule of law is subservient to socialist ideology. 1 79 Therefore, most
communist countries devoted few resources to a well-developed
18
legal system.
The Supreme Soviet elected judges for limited terms, making the judiciary highly dependent on political bodies. 8 1 As in
China, the Soviet judiciary was beholden to the Communist
Party.'8 2 Structurally, the Soviet judiciary was part of the executive branch 18 3 and became a powerful tool of the Party. 8 4 Communist courts enforced laws as expressions of socialist policy,
8 5
rather than as directives on societal behavior. 1
In 1988 the Congress of People's Deputies amended the Soviet Constitution to provide for the establishment of the Committee on Constitutional Supervision ("CCS"). 8 6 While the CCS
could invalidate unconstitutional laws, other government bodies
ignored the CCS's decisions if they were in conflict with socialist
doctrine and state power. 87 Thus, although the 1977 Constitution enumerated a number of civil, political, economic, and social rights,188 neither the CCS nor the courts were able to enforce them.8 9 Soviet scholars acknowledged this paradox, constructing and advancing the idea of two distinct de jure and de
facto constitutions.9 0 Similar to the 1977 Soviet Constitution,
Ethiopia's Constitution enumerates an impressive list of human
rights.' 9' These rights are meaningless, however, if Ethiopians
179. See Molly Warner Lien, Red Star Trek: Seeking a Role for ConstitutionalLaw in
Soviet Disunion, 30 STAN.J. INT'L L. 41, 65-67 (1994).
180. See id. at 66.
181. See Konstitutsiia SSSR art. 152.
182. See Chan, supra note 159, at 178.
183. See Scott P. Boylan, The Status ofJudicial Reform in Russia, 13 AM. U. INT'L L.
REV. 1327, 1334 (1998).
184. See id. at 1327-28 (recounting the ad hoc Soviet legal process of having the
judge telephone a party official to determine how to rule).
185. See Kuzmik, supra note 178, at 611.
186. See Lien, supra note 179, at 85 n.215.
187. See id. at 87-88.
188. See, e.g., Konstitutsiia SSSR chs. 6-7 (listing "Citizenship of the U.S.S.R/Equality of Citizens' Rights" and "The Basic Rights, Freedoms, and Duties of Citizens of the
U.S.S.R."): see also Harold J. Berman, Counterrevolution or Transition: A Response to
Human Rights and the Emergence of the State of the Rule of Law in the USSR, 40 EMORY L.J.
903, 906 (1991).
189. See Lien, supra note 179, at 87.
190. See id. at 81.
191. See supra Part II.
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do not have an impartial, professional judiciary to interpret the
constitution and ensure enforcement.
It is difficult to deny the Marxist underpinnings of Ethiopia's system of non-judicial constitutional review. Ethiopia's
brand of ethnic federalism was partly inspired by the Soviet Constitution, which combined the federal states of former nation
in similar
states into one nation. 9 2 This influence can be seen
193
phrasing of the countries' respective constitutions.
The Marxist influence on the Ethiopian political system is
also apparent in the weakness of the Ethiopian judiciary, including the deprivation of the power of judicial review.' 9 4 As stated
previously, Marxist political systems generally vest the power of
constitutional review in parliamentary bodies while purposefully
weakening the judiciary.' 9 5 Under the Derg, which espoused
Marxist ideology, the executive branch was very strong and the
judiciary was a mere appendage of the executive. 9 6 In the Soviet Union and Eastern European communist nations, courts did
not adhere to the separation of powers doctrines that had developed in Western European countries and the United States.' 97
The TPLF, which played a major role in the framing of Ethiopia's 1995 Constitution, was once a hard-line, communist
group.1 9 8 Some have even noted that the TPLF was more de192. See Baylis, supra note 2, at 577 n.155.
193. The Soviet constitution stated:
The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is an integral, federal, multinational state formed on the principle of socialist federalism as a result of the
free self-determination of nations and the voluntary association of equal Soviet
Socialist Republics.
The U.S.S.R. embodies the state unity of the Soviet people and draws all
its nations and nationalitiestogether for the purpose ofjointly building communism.
Konstitutsiia SSSR art. 70 (emphasis added). The Marxist influence is evident in the
Ethiopian Constitution, which begins, "[w]e, the Nations, Nationalities and Peoples of Ethiopia ... in full and free exercise of our right to self-determination, to building a political
community ..
" ETH. CONST. pmbl.(emphasis added).
194. See Baylis, supra note 2, at 577 n.155; Interview with Mahdere Paulos, Director, Ethiopian Women Lawyers Association, in Addis Abbaba, Eth. (Mar. 25, 2008)
("[The] HOF has such power.").
195. See Zdenek Kfihn, Worlds Apart: Western and CentralEuropeanJudicial Culture at
the Onset of the European Enlargement, 52 Am. J. CoMP. L. 531, 539-40 (2004).
196. See Interview with Eshetu W. Semayat, supra note 62.
197. See Kfihn, supra note 195, at 539-40.
198. See generally Peter Biles, Profile: Ethiopian leaderMeles Zenawi, BBC NEws, Aug.
10, 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/4545711.stm.

2008]

SILENCING THE ETHIOPIAN COURTS

283

voted to Marxism than the Derg.' 9 9 Since the fall of the Derg,
the TPLF has been the ruling faction of the EPRDF. 2 0 The
TPLF has since embraced capitalist economic development and
Western support. 20 ' However, the effects of the early Marxist influences are still apparent in Ethiopia's system of non-judicial
constitutional review.
C. Finland
Finland is an anomaly in that it is a stable democracy that
effectively utilizes nonjudicial constitutional review.20 2 Finland's
government is a unicameral parliamentary government, with no
constitutional court.20 3 The Eduskunta, a proportionally representative parliamentary body, is the supreme legal authority in
Finland. 20 4 The Eduskunta appoints a Constitutional Law Committee ("CLC") to interpret the constitution and determine the
constitutionality of legislation.20 5 The CLC decides on the constitutionality of laws prior to enactment of legislation. 20 6 The
CLC also determines if legislation is in line with international
human rights standards.20 7
The CLC draws its membership from the body of the Eduskunta, making it an inherently political, rather than judicial,
body. 20 The Eduskunta has no obligation to accept the CLC's
199. Interview with Anonymous, Professor of Law, Addis Ababa University Faculty
of Law, in Addis Ababa, Eth. (Mar. 2008).
200. See generally Biles, supra note 198.
201. See generally id.; Haile, ComparingHuman Rights in Two Ethiopian Constitutions,
supra note 1, at 10.
202. See Baylis, supra note 2, at 579 n.161; U.S. DEPT. OF ST., COUNTRY REPORTS ON
HUMAN RIGHTS PRACtiCES, FINLAND (2007), http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/
2007/100558.htm [hereinafter FINLAND HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES]. But see Maria

Dakolias, Are We There Yet?: Measuring Success of ConstitutionalReform, 39 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1117, 1137 (2006) (reporting declining voter confidence in the Finnish government).
203. See SUOMEN PERUSTUSLAKI [Constitution] §§ 24, 74 (Fin.).

204. SeeJaakko Husa, Guardingthe Constitutionalityof Laws in the Nordic Countries: A
ComparativePerspective, 48 Asi. J. CoMp. L. 345, 364-65 (2000).
205. See SUOMEN PERUSTUSLAKI § 74. The Constitutional Law Committee ("CLC")

reviews around twenty legislative acts per year. See Dakolias, supra note 202, at 1163.
206. Ministry ofJustice, Finland-The judicial System of Finland, http://www.om.
fi/en/Etusivu/Ministerio/Oikeuslaitosesite#Jurisdiction_ [hereinafter Judicial System
of Finland].
207. See Veli-Pekka Hautamdki, AuthoritativeInterpretationof the Constitution: A Comparison of Argumentation in Finland and Norway, 6.3 ELECTRONIC J. COMP. LAW, 1, 7
(2002), available at http://www.ejcl.org/63/art63-1.pdf.
208. See SUOMEN PERUSrUSLAKi § 35; Hautamdki, supra note 207, at 7.
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recommendation but has never rejected a recommendation.2 °9
To ensure compliance with Finnish law and the Constitution,
the CLC seeks the advice of legal experts and practitioners
whose opinions are met with a great deal of deference by the
CLC. 2 10 While Finnish courts do not interpret the constitution
or decide on the constitutionality of acts, they do apply constitutional law. 2 11 The courts may also determine the legality of governmental action below the parliamentary level. 21 2
For the most part, Finland's system of constitutional review
has been successful in terms of maintenance of human rights
protections.21 3 Finland's political stability has allowed the country to take the time to refine a fairly unusual system. 21 4 Ethiopia
was recovering from a long, drawn-out civil war when the framers drafted an entirely new constitution and system of government. 2 15 Ethiopia does not have the requisite political stability
as exists in Finland to engage in the same constitutional experimentation. In addition, the relationship between the Eduskunta, the CLC, and the Finnish courts is less complex than Ethiopia's bureaucratic system. 2 16 Unlike its Ethiopian counterpart,
the Finnish constitution directs courts to apply the constitution
without interpretation.21
V. PRA CTICAL IMPLICATIONS OF NON-JUDICIAL
CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW ON THE ENFORCMENT
OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN ETHIOPIA
A. The Independence of the House of the Federation
Ethiopia's system of non-judicial constitutional review has
many practical implications for the protection of human rights.
A body which is empowered to interpret the fundamental law of
See Hautamaiki, supra note 207, at 7.
See id.
See Judicial System of Finland, supra note 206.
See SUOMEN PERUSTUSLAKI §§ 106-07; EUROPEAN JUDICIAL NETWORK IN CIVIL
AND POLITICAL MATTERS, LEGAL ORDER-FINLAND, http://ec.europa.eu/civiljustice/legal-order/legal-order_fin-en.htm (last visited Oct. 4, 2008).
209.
210.
211.
212.

213. See generally FINLAND HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES, supra note 202.

214. SeeJaakko Nousianen, The Finnish System Of Government: From A Mixed Constitution To Parliamentarism,8, http://www.om.fi/en/Etusivu/Perussaannoksia/Perustuslaki
(follow "The Finnish System of Government" hyperlink).
215. See supra Introduction and Part I.
216. See supra Part II.
217. See SUOMEN PERUSTUSLAKI § 106.
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the land should be independent and free from any kind of political influence. The HOF's representatives are accountable, not
to the Constitution, but to the NN&P of Ethiopia whom they
represent. The HOF is also a political organ operating within
the context of a federal government dominated by a ruling
party, the EPRDF, which has an excess of power in all branches
of government. 218 The HOF lacks complete independence from
the EPRDF and the executive branch of government.2 ' 9 Thus,
the HOF is not likely to rule against the government when adjudicating constitutional disputes. 220 As a political organ under
the influence of the executive, the HOF should not be called
upon to decide sensitive political issues because it cannot be expected to decide such matters in a fair, unbiased manner.2 2 '
Fundamental rights and freedoms may lose out to political considerations favoring the ruling party and the executive.2 2 2 The
HOF is also not capable of ruling against itself.223 HOF members are typically also State Council members and sometimes Regional Chief Executives. 224 Therefore, the HOF may be called
upon to determine the constitutional validity of either its own
state legislation or its own exertions of power as Chief Executives
at the regional level.2 2 5 In such cases, it is unlikely that the HOF
would declare its own exertions of authority to have exceeded
constitutional bounds and impinged upon the fundamental
rights and freedoms of state citizens.2 2 6
218. See Haile, The New Ethiopian Constitution, supra note 1, at 6, 59; see also Anonymous, supra note 29, at 549-50; Herther-Spiro, supra note 1, at 337-38; Medlock Wigger,
supra note 2, at 401; Selassie, supra note 1, at 75, 78-79; Twibell, supra note 1, at 446.
219. See Haile, The New Ethiopian Constitution,supra note 1, at 52-53; see also Wigger,
supra note 2, at 401; Selassie, supra note 1, at 78-79.
220. See Haile, The New Ethiopian Constitution, supra note 1, at 52-53; see also Baylis,
supra note 2, at 553-54; Wigger, supra note 2, at 401; Selassie, supra note 1, at 78-79;
Twibell, supra note 1, at 448-49.
221. See Haile, The New Ethiopian Constitution, supra note 1, at 59; see also Baylis,
supra note 2, at 553-54; Wigger, supra note 2, at 401; Selassie, supra note 1, at 78-79;
Twibell, supra note 1, at 447.
222. See Haile, The New Ethiopian Constitution, supra note 1, at 54-59; see also Baylis,
supra note 2, at 553-54; Herther-Spiro, supra note 1, at 337-38; Medlock Wigger, supra
note 2, at 401; Selassie, supra note 1, at 75; Twibell, supra note 1, at 447.
223. See Haile, The New Ethiopian Constitution, supra note 1, at 54; see also Twibell,
supra note 1, at 447.
224. See Stephanie Kodish, Balancing Representation: Special Representation Mechanisms Addressing the Imbalance of Marginaliz,.d Voices in African Legislatures, 30 SUFFOLK
TRANSNAT'L L. REv. 1, 81-83; Selassie, supra note 1, at 78-79.
225. See Twibell, supra note 1, at 447.
226. See Haile, The New Ethiopian Constitution, supra note 1, at 59; see also Baylis,
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The case brought by the leading opposition political party,
the CUD, against the Prime Minister in 2005, is the perfect example of how the HOF is unwilling to rule against another organ
of the federal government. The CUD case involved the exertions of power by the Prime Minister following the May 2005 parliamentary elections. The CUD questioned the Prime Minister's
constitutional authority to issue a decree banning public demonstrations thereby curbing the constitutional right of assembly for
a month following the disputed elections. 2 27 The Federal First
Instance Court received the case, ruled that the dispute required
constitutional interpretation and referred the matter to the
CCI. 2 28 The CUD lawyers appealed the case to the Federal High
Court, arguing that mere application of the Constitution would
prove that the Prime Minister had overstepped his constitutional
bounds. 22 9 The CCI remanded the case to the Federal First Instance Court, ruling that no constitutional interpretation was required because the Prime Minister had not exceeded his constitutional authority. 230 The Federal High Court had no choice but
to reject the appeal on these same grounds. Subsequently, the
Federal First Instance Court came down with a ruling in line
with the CCI's decision. 23 1 This indicates an inability on the part
of the CCI and the HOF to adjudicate sensitive political issues,
because they are not independent from the ruling party.2 32 This
case also indicates the courts' reluctance to engage in constitutional interpretation involving sensitive political issues. 23 3 A Federal High CourtJudge noted that since the HOF is not independent from the ruling party, it would never rule against the government or Prime Minister.2 3 4
supra note 2, at 553-54; Wigger, supra note 2, at 401; Selassie, supra note 1, at 78-79;
Twibell, supra note 1, at 447.
227. See Dagnachew Teklu, Court Sends Meles Zenawi's Case to Inquiry Council, THE
AFRICA MONITOR, June 7, 2005, at B1, available at http://www.theafricamonitor.com/
resources/55%20English%20issue%20June%207,%202005.pdf, Interview with Anonymous, supra note 60.
228. See Teklu, supra note 227; Interview with Anonymous, supra note 60.
229. See Interview with Anonymous, supra note 60.
230. See id.
231. See id.
232. See Anonymous, supra note 29, at 549-50; Haile, supra note 1, at 54-59;
Herther-Spiro, supra note 1, at 337-38, 350-52, 354-55, 364-67; Selassie, supra note 1, at
78-79; Twibell, supra note 1, at 446-49; Interview with Anonymous, supra note 60.
233. See Twibell, supra note 1, at 446-49; Interview with Anonymous, supra note 60.
234. Interview with Anonymous, supra note 60.
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The Mrs. Kedija Beshir case demonstrates that the HOF is
much more comfortable with cases when they do not touch
upon sensitive political issues or involve the government as a defendant. 2 5 The Beshir case involved a Muslim woman who had
declined adjudication on a family matter within the Sharia
23 6
Courts.
The Constitution states that all parties in a matter
before the Sharia Courts must consent to adjudication within the
Sharia Court system or the matter must be moved to the civil
courts. 23 7
The Sharia Courts refused to acknowledge Mrs.
Beshir's constitutional rights. 23 8 She was represented by the
Ethiopian Women Lawyers Association ("EWLA") who assisted
her in appealing the matter to the CCI. 239 The HOF ruled that
her constitutional rights had been violated. 24 ° This is a positive
example of the HOF upholding the constitutional rights of an
individual. 24 1 However, this matter was seen as a simple family
matter not touching upon any sensitive political issues. 242 As was
suggested by an Ethiopian human rights defender, if Mrs.
Beshir's case had involved a sensitive political issue such as the
government's denial of a woman's right, it would never have
been decided in such a manner. 24 3 Thus, although the HOF
should be applauded for upholding Kedija Beshir's constitutional rights, this case is insufficient to conclude that the HOF is
effectively protecting the constitutional rights of citizens.2 44
What if, for instance, one of the parties in a certain constitutional case is the government?24 5 What if a certain case requires
limiting the power exercised by the government in order to enforce the constitutional rights of citizens? 24 6 The CUD case fol235. See Interview with Mahdere Paulos, supra note 194; see generally HOUSE OF THE
FEDERATION, APPEAL OF MRS. KEDIJA BESHIR AGAINST BEINGJUDGED BY SHERIA COURT AND
DECISION OF HOUSE OF FEDERATION BY WHICH DECISION OF 3RD NAIBA COURT REPEALED

(2004), http://www.hofethiopia.org/pdf/CI%2ODessiontion-4.pdf;

see also 2 ETHIOPIAN

'"'OMEN LAWYERS ASSOCIATION, SELECTED CASES 4-5.

236. See generally ETHIOPIAN WOMEN LAWYERS ASSOCIATION, supra note 235.
237. See id.; ETH. CONST. art. 34 § 5.
238. See generally ETHIOPIAN WOMEN LAWYERS ASSOCIATION, supra note 235.

239.
240.
241.
242.
243.

See
See
See
See
See

generally id.
generally id.
generally id.
generally id.
Interview with Mahdere Paulos, supra note 194; Interview with Anony-

mous, supra note 60.

244. See Interview with Mahdere Paulos, supra note 194.
245. See id.
246. See id.
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lowing the May 2005 elections perfectly exemplifies this problem.
The National Identity Claim Case in the southern region
illustrates the HOF's reluctance to rule against a government
body, albeit, in this instance, the government body was a state
and not a federal body. 24 7 The Silte people of southern Ethiopia
no longer wished to be considered part of the Gurage Nation,
but rather, a Nation in their own right.24 8 The HOF vindicated
the rights of the Silte people in their claim for national identity;
however, the extreme deference paid to the state government,
including the HOF's reluctance to even state that the HOF was
directing the state government as to how to respond, demonstrates the HOF's discomfort in confronting another government body.249 Additionally, the HOF waited years before accepting the case, hoping that the Southern Region would resolve
the matter themselves. 2 0" The Southern Region, however, did
not wish to do so without the constitutional guidance of the
HOF.2 5 1 It was suggested by an eminent Ethiopian scholar that
the National Identity Claim case, if submitted now, would never
be accepted by the CCI, nor adjudicated in the same manner by
the HOF, due to current political circumstances. 25 2 At the present time, there are currently fifteen other ethnic groups in the
Southern region making claims for national identity. 25 This is a
sensitive political issue because the Southern region already has
forty-eight NN&P represented in the HOF. 25 4 This is an example of how a political organ is not the best entity to resolve sensi255
tive political issues that raise constitutional questions.
Another issue involving the HOF's independence is the
247. See generally HOUSE

OF THE FEDERATION, DECISION OF THE HOUSE OF THE FEDER-

ATION REGARDING RESOLUTION OF CLAIM FOR IDENTITY (2001), http://www.hofethiopia.

org/pdf/CI%20Dessiontion_2.pdf [hereinafter HOF, SILTE]; see Bedri & Baylis, supra
note 15, at 400-02; Baylis, supra note 2, at 565-68.
248. See Bedri & Baylis, supra note 15, at 400-01.
249. See generally HOF, SILTE, supra note 247; see also Baylis, supra note 2, at 567.
250. See generally HOF, SILTE, supra note 247; see also Baylis, supra note 2, at 566-67.
251. See Baylis, supra note 2, at 566.
252. See Interview with Getachew Assafa, Constitutional Law Professor, Addis
Ababa University Faculty of Law, in Addis Abbaba, Eth. (Mar. 27, 2008).
253. See id.
254. THE FEDERAL DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF ETHIOPIA, HOUSE OF FEDERATION, HiSTORY- THE HOUSE OF FEDERATION, http://www.hofethiopia.org/HOF/HOF_History.
html [hereinafter HOF HISTORY].

255. See Twibell, supra note 1, at 447-48.

2008]

SILENCING THE ETHIOPIAN COURTS

289

physical proximity of the HOF/CCI and EPRDF offices that occupy the same physical structure in the capital Addis Ababa.2 5 6
Since plaintiffs must physically file complaints in the HOF and
CCI offices, a potential plaintiff bringing a case against the
EPRDF or other branches of government under its influence
may be intimidated to do so. Although the CCI Registrar suggested that potential plaintiffs are unlikely to realize that the
EPRDF and HOF occupy the same physical structure because of
a lack of exterior signage,257 the authors observed signage which
clearly indicates the location of the EPRDF offices within the
same building as the HOF and CCI.
B. Checks and Balances
Constitutional limits on the power of government are necessary for a true democracy to exist.258 The means used to limit
governmental authority, such as separation of powers, checks
and balances, and promulgation of human rights cannot be enforced without an independent body that can determine
whether the government has exceeded the limits of its constitutional authority. 259 Separation of powers is based on the idea
that no branch of government should be granted excessive
power. 26 0 Each branch of government has constitutionally mandated responsibilities and obligations and is given the power to
fulfill those responsibilities. 26 ' Branches of government are to
act as co-equals and assert their powers as a check and balance
262
on the other branches.
The Ethiopian system of non-judicial constitutional review
does not serve to protect the human rights of its citizens because
it leaves the federal and state governments with virtually unlimited power.2 6 ' The executive branch has the power to do as it
256. Interview with Registrar, Council of Constitutional Inquiry, in Addis Ababa,
Eth. (Mar. 28, 2008).
257. Id.
258. See Haile, The New Ethiopian Constitution, supra note 1, at 50.
259. See id. at 53.
260. Sudha Setty, The President's Question Time: Power, Information, and the Executive
Credibility Gap, 17 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 248, 248 (2008).
261. See Sean Mulryne, A TripartiteBattle Royal: Hamdan v. Rumsfeld and the Assertion of Separation-of-PowersPrinciples, SETON HALL L. REv. 279, 297 (2008).
262. Id.
263. See Haile, The New Ethiopian Constitution, supra note 1, at 46.
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wishes with no judicial check on its activities. 26 4 The EPRDF,
which dominates the executive, also represents the majority
party in the HOPR.2 6 5 Therefore, it is unlikely that the HOPR
would be able to curtail the excessive power of the executive
branch. In the absence of a legitimate mechanism to review the
constitutionality of the executive branch's acts and decrees, the
Prime Minister and Council of Ministers possess unbridled political power. 266

Proclamations 250 and 251, which extend the HOF's power
of constitutional review, further weaken the judiciary's ability to
serve as a check on executive power. Before promulgation of
the Proclamations, some had argued that the judiciary had the
power to review executive action as the Constitution limits HOF
constitutional review to laws enacted by federal and state legislative bodies. 26 7 However, the Proclamations extended HOF constitutional review to include all acts of the legislature and the
executive which precludes the judiciary from any form of constitutional review. 2 " According to the Proclamations, the HOF has
the power to interpret proclamations, regulations and directives
issued by the federal and state government and international
269
agreements that have been ratified by Ethiopia.
The breakdown of separation of powers in Ethiopia is a result of a system in which a political organ with strong ties to the
executive is the final arbiter of the constitutionality of the executive's political acts. One of the outcomes of this system is that
judges are fearful of ruling on politically sensitive cases. This
form of judicial timidity was evident in the CUD case brought
against the Prime Minister after the 2005 elections discussed
above.2 70 The court's timidity perhaps led it to decide that the
case involved a question of constitutional interpretation so that
it could escape having to rule on the validity of the Prime Minister's actions in a politically sensitive case. However, even if the
court had decided to rule on the validity of the Prime Minister's
264. See Proclamation 250, supra note 119, art. 21; Haile, The New Ethiopian Constitution, supra note 1, at 55.
265. See Beginning of a Transition, supra note 109, at 3.
266. See Haile, The New Ethiopian Constitution, supra note 1, at 46.
267. See Federalism and Adjudication, supra note 59, at 21.
268. See Interview with Assefa Fiseha, supra note 56.
269. Proclamation 251, supra note 118, art. 2 § 2; Proclamation 250, supra note
119, art. 2 § 5.
270. See supra Part V.A.
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actions by applying the Constitution and finding that the Prime
Minister had in fact overstepped his authority, the HOF could
have easily overturned such a decision by declaring that there
was in fact an issue of constitutional interpretation and therefore
it was not within the courts' power to decide the case.27 1 In
other words, by invoking the issue of constitutional interpretation, whether such an issue does or does not exist, the HOF can
always deprive the judiciary of the power to adjudicate sensitive
cases dealing with the limits of executive power.
C. Protection of Minorities
Constitutional interpretation in Ethiopia, as adjudicated by
a political body representing the interests of the NN&P, cannot
adequately protect the constitutional rights of minority ethnic
groups. This is in direct opposition to the ostensible aims of the
Constitution, as an expression of the sovereignty and self-determination of all of the ethnic groups of Ethiopia.2 2 An impartial
body, not constitutionally beholden to any of the ethnic groups,
is required to resolve sensitive disputes between ethnic groups.
A political body, which represents the various interests of the
ethnic groups, is not in a position to resolve such matters.
Though the HOF is meant to protect minority ethnic
groups, reflect the diversity of the Ethiopian people and promote equality and unity among Ethiopia's various ethnic groups,
this cannot be fully realized due to the HOF's majoritarian
make-up.2 7 3 Each ethnic group is represented in the HOF by
one member with an additional representative per million of its
population.2 74 Accordingly, the Oromos, the largest ethnic
group in Ethiopia, and the Amharas, another majority ethnic
group, control over fifty27 5 out of the 112276 seats in the HOF.
Thus, even though the HOF was meant to be a counter271. See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
272. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.

273.

TSEGAYE REGASSA, STATE CONSTITUTIONS IN FEDERAL ETHIOPIA: A PRELIMINARY

2-3 (2004), available at http://camlaw.rutgers.edu/statecon/subpapers/
regassa.pdf.
274. ETH. CONST. art. 61 § 2.
275. Ethiopia's total population is approximately 82 million. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE WORLD FACTBOOK, ETHIOPIA (2008), https://www.cia.gov/library/
publications/the-world-factbook/geos/et.html. The Oromos make up 32.1% of the
population while the Amharas make up another 30.1%. Id.
276. HOF HISTORY, supra note 254.
OBSERVATION
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majoritarian balance to the majoritarianism in the HOPR, the
larger ethnic groups still maintain a numerical advantage. It is
constitutionally mandated that two-thirds of the 112 members of
the HOF constitutes a quorum for voting purposes. 27 7 This
means that a vote by thirty-eight out the seventy-five present
27
members is enough for a decision to be binding in the HOF
and could lead to the possibility that certain groups with larger
representation can dominate decisions. Accordingly, the
majoritarian composition of the HOF could lead to the tyranny
of the majority in sensitive constitutional disputes between ethnic groups.
D. Access to Justice
Non-judicial constitutional review in Ethiopia has created
an overly bureaucratic, inefficient system ofjustice that has negatively impacted access to justice for Ethiopia's citizens. In its entire fifteen year history, the HOF has issued only four decisions. 2 " Although the HOF is technically accessible to every
Ethiopian, there is very little public awareness of its existence or
function. 2 0" Non-judicial constitutional review has also stopped
Ethiopian judges from developing a robust body of human
2
rights jurisprudence. 1'
Part of the reason for the HOF's inefficiency in constitutional review rests in the part-time status of the institution. Constitutional review should be a full-time endeavor; yet, the only
full-time employee of the CCI is its Registrar who is not involved
in adjudicating constitutional cases.2 82 The HOF is supposed to
meet twice a year, 2 3 and the CCI is mandated to meet four times
per year,28 4 but the CCI rarely fulfills its mandate and the HOF
routinely does not meet often enough to address all the issues
put before it.28 5 Even when the CCI does convene, many times
277.

ETH. CONST. art. 64 § 1.
278. See id.
279. See Interview with Registrar, supra note 256; Interview with Getahun Kassa,
supra note 56.
280. See Interview with Registrar, supra note 256.
281. See Interview with Tilahun Teshome, supra note 58.
282. ETH. CONST. art. 67.
283. See Interview with Registrar, supra note 256.
284. Proclamation 250, supra note 119, art. 13.
285. See Interview with Registrar, supra note 256; Interview with Getahun Kassa,
supra note 56.
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there is not a quorum, and therefore they cannot conduct any
business related to constitutional review.2" 6 The HOF and CCI
cannot fully consider cases and address them expeditiously as
part-time institutions2" 7 and this has led to public inaccessibility.
A mere seventy-two cases regarding constitutional interpretation have been submitted to the CCI Registrar in fifteen
years.2" 8 The HOF and CCI have only accepted four of these
cases, rejecting the vast majority on procedural and substantive
grounds. 28 9 One cannot but marvel at such a low number of submitted cases emanating from a country of seventy million people
that has experienced substantial human rights issues. Of the
sixty-eight cases submitted to the CCI, only four or five have
been referred from the courts. 290 This perhaps signals that
courts are either intimidated by the prospect of referring cases
to the CCI or are simply unaware of which cases are appropriate
for CCI and HOF adjudication. The remaining sixty-four cases
individuals, organizations, and other
were direct appeals 29from
1
government bodies.
The small number of cases submitted to the CCI and HOF
reveals the lack of public awareness regarding the important
functions of these institutions. Although the Ministry of Justice
and non-governmental organizations have tried to initiate public
outreach, 29 2 neither the HOF nor the CCI has educated the public or practitioners on how to navigate this complicated system.
The low number also indicates that legal practitioners do not
take the CCI seriously due to its lack of capacity. 29 3 Though the
level of cases being brought to the CCI and HOF is well below
what it should be, the CCI and HOF would not have the capacity
to manage an increase in cases above its current level.29 4
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VI. CONCLUSION: THE NEED FOR AN INDEPENDENT,
ORGANIZED AND EFFECTIVE SYSTEM OFJUDICIAL
REVIEW IN ETHIOPIA
Ethiopia's system of constitutional review is broken. As explored in the previous sections, the HOF, which has been in existence for over a decade, has proven itself a conceptual and practical failure in constitutional adjudication. The HOF's inefficiency and political subjectivity in interpreting the FDRE
Constitution, and the numerous avenues for abuse, have led and
will lead to failure in protecting the fundamental rights and freedoms of citizens. The power of constitutional interpretation
should be taken away from the HOF and placed with a strengthened judiciary that must undergo judicial reforms.
The Constitution empowers the judiciary and other governmental organs to respect and enforce the Constitution's human
rights provisions. 29 5 The judiciary, however, cannot fulfill this
role and enforce the constitutional provisions concerning
human and democratic rights and freedoms if its most powerful
and important tool-judicial review-is withheld. Because the
courts are constitutionally independent and accountable to no
one but the law, they are the best option for protecting the
human rights enshrined in the Constitution.
The institution of judicial review has not been without its
detractors. Those who argue againstjudicial review contend that
it is undemocratic because it allows unelected judges to nullify
the acts of democratically elected legislatures who are accountable to the people.2 9 6 They also argue that it violates the separation of powers doctrine by allowing the courts, in the process of
issuing judgments, to encroach upon the legislature's lawmaking
functions. 297 Prominent jurists who have argued in favor ofjudicial review note that necessary governmental limitations are best
enforced by the courts. 298 Judicial review is one of the institu295. See supra Part 111.3.
296. See Dennis Davis et. al., Democracy and Constitutionalism: The Role of ConstitutionalInterpretation,in RIGHTS AND CONSTITUTIONALISM: THE NEW SOUTH AFRICAN LEGAL
ORDER 1, 6 (Dawid van Wyk et. al. eds., 1994).
297. See Bruce G. Peabody, LegislatingFromThe Bench: A DefinitionAnd A Defense, 1
LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 185, 217-18 (2007).
298. See HENRYJ. ABRAHAM, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS: AN INTRODUCTORY ANALYSIS OF
THE COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES, ENGLAND, AND FRANCE

314 (1993).
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tional checks against excesses by federal and state legislatures. 2 9
If a government's power vis-A-vis its citizens is to be limited, an
institution insulated from popular control, like the judiciary, is
best placed to assume this role.3"' In addition, the courts' closeness to the law creates a special institutional competence for the
exercise of the power of constitutional interpretation."'
When the courts are charged with judicial review and can
check the excesses of the other branches of government, they
also engage in the safeguarding of their own independence.
In Ethiopia, the parliament has used its power to annul the effects of judicial decisions. The 2001 Anti-Corruption Proclamation 303 is a case in point. Although a court had ordered the release of the former Chief Military General, Siye Abraha, on bail
following his corruption case, Parliament subsequently issued an
amendment to the proclamation denying the right to bail for
persons accused of alleged corruption. 0 4 Abraha and twentyone others accused of corruption who retroactively lost their
right to bail because of the new amendment appealed to the CCI
for invalidation of the amendment on the basis of non-retroactivity of criminal law, which is one of the fundamental principles in
Chapter III of the Constitution.0 5 After two years, the CCI recommended to the House of Federation that their claim be rejected, finding that the amending proclamation was not unconstitutional. 0 6
As the above-mentioned case demonstrates, granting the judiciary the power of judicial review through constitutional reform alone will not suffice. There is also the need for judicial
reform to strengthen the judiciary so it is up to the important
299. See id.
300. See WALTER F. MURPHY ET. AL., AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION
267 (1995).
301. See id. at 266.
302. See ABRAHAM, supra note 298, at 315.
303. Anti-Corruption Special Procedure and Rules of Evidence (Amendment)
Proclamation, Proc. No. 239 (2001) (Eth.), available at http://www.federalsupreme
court.gov.et/Negarit%20Gazeta/Gazeta-1993/Proc%20No. %20239-2001 %20Anti-Corruption%20Special%2OProcedure%20and%2ORul.pdf.
304. See GETACIIEW KITAW, ETHIOPIAN BAR ASSOCIATION, JUDICIAL REFORM FOR HARNESSING ECONOMIC GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT 13, http://Nv.eeaecon.org/EEA/conferences/papers/Getachew%20Kita%20-%20PROBLEMS%200F%20THE%20ETHIOPIA%20JUDICLARY.doc.
305. ETH. CONST. art. 22.
306. See Interview with Eshetu W.Semayat, supra note 62.
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task ofjudicial review and can withstand the strongarming of the
executive ad legislature. Judicial reforms seek to create an independent and effective judiciary that is able to improve governance and advance development. The Ethiopian government has
embarked upon a program of judicial reform. Although this is
commendable, the government's program is limited mainly to
file management and organizational issues.3 ° 7 To make meaningful changes in the true sense ofjudicial reform, there is much
more to be done. Earlier assessments by justice sector reform
programs in Ethiopia revealed deficits in the institutional, organizational, human and financial capacity of both the federal and
regional courts. 30 ' This in turn can be expressed in terms of the
manner judges are appointed, promoted, disciplined and removed.3 0 9
In order to safeguard and strengthen the judiciary's independence and therefore increase its ability to effectively engage
in judicial review the system of appointing judges in Ethiopia
should be reformed. The president and vice president of the
Federal Supreme Court are recommended by the Prime Minister and appointed by the HOPR. 310 For other federal judges, the
Prime Minister submits candidates selected by the Federal Judicial Administrative Council to the HOPR for appointment.'
The parliament has thus far never denied the appointment of a
judge submitted by the Prime Minister. 12 This indicates the absence of the checks and balances envisaged by the Constitution.
In other countries, Bar Associations, law schools, practicing lawyers and others comprise judicial administration councils that
aid in the appointment of judges,3 1 3 and lessen the potential for
executive abuse in appointments. This practice helps in making
the appointments ofjudges more transparent and should be implemented in Ethiopia.
The need for judicial reform is uncontestable. Although
the government has embarked upon a judicial reform program,
ideas alone, however progressive, cannot bring about desired im307.
308.
309.
310.
311.
312.
313.
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provements. Big picture reforms such as constitutional restructuring accompanied by bottom-up reforms that seek to improve
the judiciary's infrastructure, disseminate relevant laws to the judiciary, and address the low salaries of judges would help in
strengthening the judiciary and improving its ability to conduct
judicial review.

